Introduction
The global professional service firm (GPSF) is now a significant agent in national and transnational political economies. Yet, in existing literatures on transnational governance the role of these firms is somewhat hidden by a tendency to place the professions at centre stage. Thus, whilst the literature recognizes how 'the professions in modern society have assumed leading roles in the creation and tending of institution' (Scott, 2008:219) , there has been less systematic attention to the role of GPSFs as institutional agents. In part this can be explained by the fact that the sociology of the professions traditionally does not recognize the analytically distinct nature or role of professional organizations within professionalization and broader institutionalization projects . Yet, such a state of affairs no longer seems tenable. GPSFs have their own agendas, capabilities and patterns of activities that are both related to but also distinct from those of the wider professional communities to which they belong. From prominent and politically inscribed cases such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Arnold, 2005) and carbon trading markets (Knox-Hayes, 2009) , to less-well reported and softer systems such as regimes around sustainable building design (Bulkeley and Jordan, 2012; Faulconbridge, 2013) and competition (antitrust) agreements (Morgan, 2006) , GPSFs have been central actors in the production of new forms of governance. Such compacts are of course important for those actors directly engaged in the issues in question. Perhaps more importantly, though, they also matter because, as Suddaby and Viale (2011) argue, through their actions GPSFs have wider spin-off effects on adjacent fields, whether that is the development of employment law as a result of trade agreements or property financing as a result of sustainable design regimes.
In this chapter we, thus, seek to highlight the importance of advancing the work that does exist on GPSFs in the institutionalization of transnational governance regimes through a more careful consideration of the identities, projects and effects of the firms in question. We contend that in their attempts to develop new markets, services and more efficient internal organizational models, GPSFs exercise far reaching institutional effects as they challenge governance regimes, disrupt/create jurisdictions, and transform identities, practices and systems of regulation in the professions themselves. They do this, we suggest, through three strategies associated with scope of control, defining scales of knowledge resources, and the production of ecologies of linked interests. This chapter provides, then, a contribution to on-going attempts to 'revisit theories of professionalism, which did not fully anticipate the shift of professional work to the context of large organizations' (Suddaby et al., 2007: 25) .
The GPSF in context
It is important to begin by clarifying what exactly is meant by GPSF. Such clarification is Important because we use the term GPSF to refer to two related but subtly different groups of organizations (on this differentiation and the debate it inspires see von Nordenflycht, 2010) . On the one hand we have the 'old' professional service firms, old being used to indicate organizations employing professionals from long-ago established and state recognised professions. Key examples are accountancy, architecture and law (for analysis of each see respectively Cooper and Robson, 2006; Faulconbridge, 2010; Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013) . Whilst firms have existed in these professions for decades or centuries, they have acquired an increasingly global scale in the latter years of the 20 th century. In all cases these 'old' GPSFs exploit the monopolies over markets afforded to them by professional closure regimes which restrict the production and deliver of services to registered individuals and firms structured in line with clearly defined (usually by national professional associations) regulations (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007) .
One the other hand we have the 'new' professional service firms. 'New' is used to indicate the rise of a series of occupations that have sought to mimic and claim the same status as the 'old'
professions whilst developing new organizational forms and practices. Examples include executive search, management consultancy and project management (see respectively Faulconbridge et al., 2008; McKenna, 2006; Hodgson, 2007; Paton et al., 2013) . Distinctive about these firms is the absence of a clearly defined status for the 'professionals' employed (they are not part of a state regulated profession), yet a tendency to present services as professional. Such attempts stress knowledge richness, ethical practice and fiduciary role mimicking the logics underlying the state supported closure projects of the 'old' professions (Muzio et al., 2011) .
Whilst there are important differences between the 'old' and 'new' professional service firms (as summarised by von Nordenflycht, 2010), we badge both as GPSFs as the two do share one important commonality: the last years of the twentieth and early years of the twenty-first century have seen firms exert significant forms of agency designed to ensure control and influence over key issues such as corporate globalization, trade regulation, carbon markets etc. This agency, which we examine in more detail in the next section of the chapter, emerges from important changes in the strategies of GPSFs over time. Figure 1 gives examples of both 'old' and 'new' GPSFs and their key organizational characteristics.
Organizational strategies and the institutional agency of GPSFs
GPSFs have not always been so large and influential. In their earliest guise, which for some such as accountancy firms dates back to the late nineteenth century, GPSFs simply followed their clients.
Overseas offices were established in locations where home-country clients had or were considering setting up operations (Beaverstock et al., 1999; Cooper and Robson, 2006; Bagchi-Sen and Sen, 1997; Faulconbridge et al., 2008) . Globalization was, then, very much about providing a service to existing clients, and thus sometimes involved establishing offices but, in cases where client needs were sporadic, could also mean establishing best friend alliances with local companies.
[Insert Figure 1 somewhere here]
Over time, the strategies of GPSFs have evolved. Initial forays overseas gave organizations a taste for new markets and highlighted the potential to acquire new clients. Hence, GPSFs became market seekers, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s as neoliberal reforms led to more and more clients globalizing their operations. This created an ever greater role for fully owned overseas offices (on this development trajectory see Bagchi-Sen and Sen, 1997; Faulconbridge et al., 2008) . In terms of our discussion here, the initial two stages (client follower and market seeker) are, however, of less significance than a third stage, which we call market making. In this stage, which is associated with the last years of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty-first century, GPSFs became active agents in the institutionalization of new transnational regimes. This involves both the importing of already existing products and markets into new geographical contexts as part of efforts to reduce the complexities of transnational practice -exemplified by the cases of bankruptcy law (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009 ) and sustainable building assessment tools (Cole and Valdebenito, in press ) -and the creation of supra-national compacts designed to govern activities outside of the nation-stateas exemplified by GATS (Arnold, 2005) and competition agreements (Morgan, 2006) . In the market making stage, GPSFs rely upon their owned offices to act as staging posts for forms of institutional work designed to shape rules, norms and logics in ways that locate GPSFs at the centre of new economic, political and social regimes (see Beaverstock et al., 2010; Smets et al., 2012; Suddaby et al., 2007) . It is to the nature of this institutional work and its impacts we now turn.
GPSFs and their institutional work strategies
This section examines key trends in relation to how GPSFs exercise institutional agency. This is in line with the recent focus in the sociology of the professions (Leicht and Fennell, 2008; Scott, 2008; Viale and Suddaby, 2011; Muzio et al, 2013) on the agency of the professionals as 'the preeminent institutional agents of our time' (Scott, 2008, 219) , who as 'lords of the dance' choreograph the broader transformation of societal and economic systems.
In this analysis, we adopt the concept of institutional work, introduced by Lawrence et al. (2009) , to capture the diverse forms of GPSF action that have led to new transnational settlements relating to issues as diverse as climate change, international trade and the governance of the global economy. By institutions we mean the widely recognised rules, norms and cultural-cognitive schemes that govern everyday practice relating to particular issues (on this see Scott, 2008) ; thus institutions are the key structuring device of economies and societies. These institutional regimes are increasingly transnational in scale, in contrast to earlier periods in which national scale regimes dominated (Djelic and Quack, 2010) . The concept of institutional work understands the process of institutionalization by which (transnational) rules, norms and cultures come to gain widespread recognition and influence to involve three forms of agency: creation, maintenance and/or disruption. We suggest disruption and creation are especially relevant to our story of the role of GPSFS in the development of transnational governance regimes, with agency being exercised to disrupt or create institutions depending on what is needed to protect the interests of the GPSFs in question.
In terms of the actual forms that agency takes, the institutional work literature draws our attention to the importance of a diverse array of strategies, from the overt such as lobbying (Greenwood et al., 2002) and the deployment of discourses to legitimise and inspire change (Phillips and Nelson, 2004) , to the more covert, banal and often missed such as the use of human resource practices, like recruitment and training, to produce suitable individuals which internalize appropriate values and norms Pache and Santos, 2010) , and the quiet role modelling of new institutional regimes which then organically diffuse and gain widespread influence (Smets et al., 2012) . We suggest that all of these forms of agency are relevant to GPSFs and their attempts to develop transnational governance regimes.
As an illustrative case study, drawing on series of published studies (Arnold, 2005; Robson et al., 2007; Suddaby et al, 2007) , we use the example of Big Four accountancy firms. These have been selected because they are not only the most sophisticated GPSFs but are, as indicated by Figure 1 , amongst the largest and most global GPSFs. Furthermore, and crucially for our arguments here, they have been particularly significant within processes of institutionalization, interacting with nation states and supra-national entities like the EU, WTO and IMF to reframe key institutions in ways that support their own professional projects. Crucially these attempts at institutional work have had broader repercussions, as they reverberate through the transnational field affecting existing institutions such as local regulation and qualification systems, national markets and occupational jurisdictions, and established societal and corporate practices. In particular, we focus below on three interrelated examples: the role of the Big Four accountancy GPSFs in reframing established auditing practices and markets (Robson et al., 2007) ; their attempts to change accountancy qualification regimes to create a new transnational designation for business professionals (Suddaby et al, 2007) ;
and their use of WTO procedures to challenge national regulations as part of efforts to develop and control a global market for their services (Arnold, 2005) .
Three examples of institutionalization by GPSFs
Our first example of the institutional role played by Big Four accountancy firms refers to an issue which is at the heart of the accountancy professionalization project (MacDonald, 1995) : the redefinition of auditing. Auditing has traditionally represented one of the economic cornerstones of the accountancy profession. Furthermore, as a highly visible example of what accountants do, it is one of their key sources of (self) identity, as well as one of the most persuasive justifications for their professional status as gatekeepers (Coffee, 2005) of public interest (the protection of investors, creditors and the general public through the certification of corporate accounts). Yet, despite its foundational role at the heart of the accountancy project, auditing fees have over the last few decades been under growing pressure. This reflects the increasing commodification and routinization of this area of practice as well as the reluctance of clients to pay for a regulatory service which does not directly add value to their business (Coffee, 2005) . In this context, accountancy firms have been growing alternative and more profitable lines of business such as tax advisory and management consultancy services, with auditing divisions decreasing in economic and political significance within the firms which they historically dominated. Indeed, reflecting this development, during the 1990s the main strategy of the Big Four centred around the treatment of auditing as a loss leader to secure clients for more lucrative consultancy services, with auditing partners being rewarded for their ability to cross-sell the firms' broader expertise to their clients (Coffee, 2005; Robson et al., 2007) .
Consequently, firms embarked on a project to redefine and reframe auditing practices through the development of Business Risk Audit (BRA) methodologies (Robson et al., 2007) . BRA expands the remit of the traditional audit to include a comprehensive focus on risk management and business assurance. In particular, audits are broadened to include the analysis of corporate strategies and business processes and the way these generate business risks which in turn affect financial statements. This repositioning of the audit was theorized by firms as important for clients not only because as a more holistic perspective it was more likely to increase the accuracy and reliability of audits, but also because by enlarging its remit BRA methodologies redefine auditing from a 'compliance' to a 'value-creation' tool. By casting a wider perspective on the operations and activities of a firm, BRA generates valuable knowledge on its current performance, as well as future risks and opportunities. Thus, through the development of BRA large accountancy firms have effectively redrawn the boundaries between auditing, risk management and management consultancy; as a result auditors are empowered to advice clients on a wide range of matters pertaining to their business whilst the economic potential of auditing services is maximised.
Our second example broadens our focus from the technical (i.e. auditing) to the regulatory.
Historically, professions have developed within the confines of the nation state and professionalization processes have often unfolded as part of broader state building projects (Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990) . In this context, national regulations tend to control both who can deliver professional services (control over the production of producers) and how professional activities can be legally organized, produced, traded and consumed (control over the production by producers) (Abel, 1988) . This implies that whilst global professional services firms have invested to develop one firm models of management (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013 ) based on globally integrated structures and seamless service delivery practices, their operations are often disrupted and fragmented by national regulatory requirements (Faulconbridge, 2008) . Big Four accountancy firms have responded to such national impediments by actively trying to subvert local restrictions to their activities, developing in the process a global market for their services as well as helping to consolidate emerging transnational governance regimes which coexist with national regimes.
At the heart of the Big Four's attempts to change national regulations are WTO initiatives such as GATS article VI:4 and the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector; these being successfully used to challenge domestic regulations which restricted global accountancy firms' activities in specific jurisdictions. Thus the autonomy of democratically elected institutions, such as national governments and professional associations, over traditionally domestic matter such as credentials, qualification regimes, ethical codes and standards of practice became subordinated to WTO mandated tests of necessity and proportionality, as well as to analyses of their compatibility with international standards. The inability of Greece in the 1990s to resist liberalization and to reregulate its own domestic accountancy profession, in face of opposition from large professional services firms and international organizations such as the OECD, represents a clear example of the effects of these measures (Caramanis, 2002) .
Our final example extends this analysis and indicates how large firms have been actively seeking to build a transnational training and qualification system around the new XYZ designation (Suddaby et al., 2007; Covaleski et al., 2003) . This was intended as a transnational multidisciplinary qualification for global business professional; an elite MBA for accountants which crucially sought to deliver international consistency, visibility and recognition in professional qualification regimes so as to support more effectively the requirements of GPSFs and their clients. XYZ effectively operated as a market driven qualification whose legitimacy rested on its ability to add value to its holders, employers and users. The qualification effectively sanctioned a division between a business advisory elite which operated at a transnational level and the rest of the accountancy profession which continued to be embedded and constrained by national institutions, values and arrangements (Suddaby et al., 2007) . Although ultimately unsuccessful, the XYZ project provides a clear example of a transnational professional qualification which was explicitly designed to support the requirements and activities of GPSFs. In doing so it would have provided Big Four accountancy firms with an effective way to short-circuit national systems for the regulation of the production of producers and to recruit individual practitioners educated and socialized into the realities and norms of transnational professional work. This points out to the increasing role of GPSFs as sites of professional identity formation and regulation (Cooper and Robson, 2006) as firms deploy increasingly sophisticated HRM techniques, such as recruitment and selection, mentoring and corporate training programmes to mould the subjectivities of the professionals they employ in ways that best serve corporate priorities (Covaleski et al., 1995; Anderson Gough et al., 1998; Grey, 1998) .
As such, this example indicates how 'the historical regulatory bargain between professional associations and nation states is being superseded by a new compact between conglomerate professional firms and transnational trade organizations' (Suddaby et al., 2007: 334) . In this context, GPSFs are hollowing out historical functions of the nation state and reframing these as part of new transnational governance regimes of which they are a key component.
GPSFs in transnational governance ecologies
The three examples from the accountancy profession discussed above all point to significant forms 
The process and impacts of institutional work by GPSFs
Reflecting the suggestion in the chapter by Seabrooke and Henriksen (this volume) that issues of scope, autonomy, resources, hiring, and knowledge are significant in analyses of the role of professionals in transnational regimes, the discussion here reveals three important dynamics in the transnational institutional work of GPSFs.
Theorizing the scope of control. Exemplified by work associated with the institutionalization of BRA, we see GPSFs engaging in concerted efforts to expand the scope of their control over certain markets through a theorization process similar to that outlined by (Greenwood et al., 2002) . This process identifies the problem at hand, and the solution GPSFs can provide to this problem. In the case of BRA the problem related to the reactive nature and the limited value-added of traditional auditing services, and the solution was provided by the integrated audit and risk assurance methodologies developed by Big Four firms. Through this theorizing firms were able to position themselves in a central position within the increasingly transnational field of business advisory services (Arnold, 2005; Barrett et al., 2005; Suddaby et al., 2007) . Similar processes of theorization are present in other cases relating to the role of GPSFs in the development of transnational regimes -such as international bankruptcy and sustainable building design -yet to date the existing literature pays limited attention to the firms in question, something this chapter and the theoretical framing here developed can help to resolve.
Defining scales of knowledge resources. As part of efforts to secure influence in transnational markets and regimes, GPSFs engage in sustained efforts to detach their claims of knowledge and expertise from national jurisdictions and reattach them to transnational regimes. This is associated with broader evolutions in the basis of the knowledge claims of the professions (Evetts, 1998 (Evetts, , 2011 , particularly towards a transnational arena in which the state is just but one actor in governance regimes . see Hussain and Ventresca, 2010 where shared interest bind the GPSF to the neoliberal agenda of the Washington consensus (Morgan, 2006) . This suggests that transnational regimes are the outcome of a strategic compact between parties that together seek to control issues that are central to the wider economic and social order.
Conclusions
We have in GPSFs a crucial locus of power and agency that is integral to and also exemplary of the construction of new transnational regimes that are transforming the system of the professions (Abbott, 1988) as well as the wider political-economy. Reflecting broader trajectories, GPSFs in various ways disconnect themselves from national professional projects and redefine their jurisdictions through three processes outlined in the previous section of the chapter. It thus seems crucial to more carefully locate GPSFs in debates about transnational governance and institutional change, transcending the established tendency to focus on professional firms and individual professionals in isolation, without consideration of the broader institutional context they inhabit and that help form.
In closing we propose three agendas for future research that would enhance understanding of the role of GPSFs in transnational regimes. First, it seems important to further unpack the organizational strategies of the firms in question. By this we mean the ways that individual GPSFs seek to enact the scope, knowledge resource and ecology strategies outlined in this chapter. To date we know little about the efforts made by individual firms as part of their corporate strategies to enact transnational institutional projects. Second, the heterogeneity in the successes of GPSFs and the regimes they sanction in different countries needs closer scrutiny. As Djelic and Quack (2003) highlight, transnational regimes are additional layers of governance that coexist with national
regimes. Yet, little effort has been made to bring back-in the national scale and consider how There is, then, much to be done to further specify the role of GPSFs in transnational institutional processes including the creation and operation of those regimes that are so central to the functioning of contemporary economies and societies.
